The European Hormuz Basket Index  ·  Afterbuy Research  ·  Issue Nº 4  ·  May 2026

Europe's first Hormuz winter is already priced in

Nine weeks of cumulative disruption have moved from the news cycle into European supply chains. Households face €150 to €2,200 in additional annual costs depending on how the conflict resolves – with German, British and Dutch homes most exposed. The timing is fixed regardless of what happens in the Gulf next.

UK 81 NL 79 DE 85 PL 71 AT 67 CH 64 FR 61 TR 56 ES 48 IT 44 STRAIT OF HORMUZ Cumulative disruption · 9+ weeks EXPOSURE SCORE 80–90 Critical 65–79 High 50–64 Medium Under 50 Low
#1
Germany
85 / 100
#2
United Kingdom
81 / 100
#3
Netherlands
79 / 100
#4
Poland
71 / 100
#5
Austria
67 / 100
#6
Switzerland
64 / 100
#7
France
61 / 100
#8
Turkey
56 / 100
#9
Spain
48 / 100
#10
Italy
44 / 100

Nine weeks of disruption. One winter to absorb the cost.

Wholesale energy and feedstock prices have been re-pricing across European supply chains since 28 February 2026. By autumn, those increases land in retail catalogues and household bills. The question this index answers is not whether the cost will arrive – it is which countries are most exposed to it, and through which goods.

The Afterbuy Research European Hormuz Basket Index ranks ten European economies on their structural exposure to consumer-price pass-through across 25 everyday household goods. Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands sit in the critical band. Italy and Spain absorb least. The forty-one-point spread is driven by energy mix, retail intensity and industrial composition – not by what the Strait does next week.

The index is built from six independently weighted dimensions measuring LNG dependence, e-commerce intensity, petrochemical feedstock reliance, synthetic textile consumption, energy storage buffer, and supply-chain concentration. Inputs are drawn from named public sources covering 2024 to 2026, including the European Central Bank's March 2026 staff projections, which set the inflation pass-through framework used in the household impact estimates below. The frame is cumulative: scores are anchored to the elapsed nine-plus weeks since 28 February, not to the diplomatic status of the Strait at any given moment.

9+ wk
Cumulative disruption since 28 Feb
~20%
Global LNG supply transits Hormuz
~46%
Global urea flows from Arabian Gulf
~28%
EU gas storage entering 2026 season
~9%
Qatar share of total EU LNG imports
25
Everyday basket items scored
Whatever happens in the Gulf next, the price wave hitting European shelves this autumn is already in motion. The hard question is no longer whether households absorb it, but which households absorb it first.
– Index findings, May 2026
Update since first publication
  • Late April: The Pakistan-mediated Islamabad Talks between the US and Iran broke down without restoring shipping. The conditional 8 April ceasefire has not held in practice.
  • 13 April: The US imposed a counter-blockade on Iranian ports. The strait is now under a "dual blockade" - the US Navy is restricting traffic to Iranian ports while Iran continues to restrict passage through the strait.
  • 1 May: The US State Department launched the Maritime Freedom Construct, a multinational coalition initiative to escort commercial shipping through the strait. Several NATO allies have declined to join.
  • Ras Laffan recovery extended: QatarEnergy now confirms two LNG mega-trains were destroyed in March strikes - approximately 17% of Qatari capacity will be offline for three to five years. Wood Mackenzie and Baker Hughes do not expect a full restart before late August at the earliest.
  • Industry consensus on duration: A Dallas Fed survey of 120 oil and gas executives finds 80% expect no full reopening of the strait before August. Vessel traffic remains at roughly 5% of pre-crisis levels (CNN, May 2026).
As of 5 May 2026 · Volatile point-in-time figures · Do not feed the index calculation
~28%
EU gas storage entering 2026 injection season (GIE, April 2026)
~20%
Share of global LNG supply that transits Hormuz (Wood Mackenzie)
~46%
Share of global urea fertiliser flows from the Arabian Gulf (Signal Ocean)
~9%
Qatar's share of total EU LNG imports in 2025 (Reuters)
Sources - Gas Infrastructure Europe · Wood Mackenzie · Signal Ocean · Reuters

Six things that will be a problem regardless of what happens next

Whatever the headlines say tomorrow - Strait open, Strait closed, ceasefire, escalation, partial reopening - the disruption that has already occurred has consequences that cannot be unwound by political developments alone. These are the costs now baked into European supply chains for the months ahead, no matter what the news says.

9+weeks
Cumulative disruption since 28 February 2026 - the floor figure that anchors every projection on this page.
90days
Tanker rerouting

Shipping logistics will not normalise overnight

Even on the day the Strait reopens cleanly, vessel positioning, insurance contracts, and rerouted cargo schedules take roughly three months to return to pre-crisis equilibrium. Freight cost premiums on that lag continue feeding into landed retail prices.

Locked in regardless of Strait status
1winter
Gas storage refill

EU gas storage cannot be rebuilt before next winter

EU gas storage entered the 2026 injection season at approximately 28% – the lowest start to a refill cycle since 2021–22. A full summer-long injection cycle will be required to approach winter targets, and that cycle has begun in a tight market. Households face a winter heating-bill exposure that is now structural for at least one heating season.

Source: Gas Infrastructure Europe
~46%
Urea trade

Fertiliser pass-through to food prices is already in motion

The Arabian Gulf accounts for approximately 46% of global seaborne urea fertiliser flows. Disruption to those flows during a spring planting window has consequences that propagate through the next harvest cycle into bread, cooking oil, and meat prices - a transmission lag of months, not weeks, that is already underway.

Source: Signal Ocean / TSG, March 2026
1in 5
LNG cargoes

Risk premiums on Hormuz-routed LNG will persist

One in five LNG cargoes globally transits the Strait of Hormuz. Even after a return to normal shipping, war-risk insurance premiums and re-priced long-term supply contracts carry forward into 2027 contract pricing. The risk premium does not vanish on the day the headlines do.

Source: Wood Mackenzie, March 2026
ByChristmas
Retail repricing

Producer-price inflation has not yet hit the shelf

European retail typically lags wholesale energy and feedstock prices by three to nine months. Increases in producer prices already incurred since February 2026 will land in autumn and winter 2026 retail catalogues – apparel, electronics, household goods – regardless of what wholesale prices do from here.

Pass-through lag · structural
Adecade
Sourcing posture

European LNG sourcing has now been re-evaluated

Procurement teams across European utilities and industrial buyers are now actively re-evaluating Qatar-routed supply contracts. Whether or not the Strait remains open, the sourcing decisions taken in 2026 will shape European LNG supply mix into the 2030s. The political event has already triggered structural change.

Multi-year structural shift

By Christmas, every European household pays a share of the disruption

The European Central Bank set out three explicit Hormuz scenarios in its March 2026 staff projections – baseline, adverse and severe. Applied to country consumption baskets and weighted by structural exposure, those scenarios translate into the additional household costs below. The pass-through window – the lag between wholesale price increases and shelf prices – is between three and nine months for European retail. The disruption began on 28 February 2026. Households start paying the bill between November 2026 and February 2027.
ECB severe scenario, headline finding
+4.4% then +4.8%
Eurozone HICP inflation under the ECB severe scenario for 2026 and 2027 respectively – the largest two-year cumulative inflation shock in ECB projection history outside the 2022 energy crisis.
Scenario A Strait reopens by Q3 2026

Pass-through absorbs in the supply chain

ECB baseline: oil $90/bbl, gas €50/MWh peak Q2 2026; HICP 2.6% in 2026.

Risk premiums fade through autumn. Storage refills slowly but to target. Producer-price inflation already incurred still lands at retail in Q4. The €13 billion EU energy import bill from March remains a one-off shock.

  • Germany€150–300
  • United Kingdom£140–280
  • Netherlands€140–270
  • PolandPLN 600–1,200
  • Austria€120–240
  • SwitzerlandCHF 130–260
  • France€100–210
  • Spain€70–160
  • Italy€60–140
Scenario B Disruption sustained through 2026

Winter heating cycle hits with depleted storage

ECB adverse: oil $119/bbl, gas €87/MWh peak Q2 2026; HICP 3.5% in 2026.

EU storage enters winter below 70% of target. Long-term LNG contracts re-price into 2027 at the new risk premium. Fertiliser shortfall flows through to spring food prices. UK inflation forecast to breach 5% – the highest in Europe.

  • Germany€450–800
  • United Kingdom£420–760
  • Netherlands€400–720
  • PolandPLN 1,800–3,200
  • Austria€350–650
  • SwitzerlandCHF 380–680
  • France€280–520
  • Spain€200–380
  • Italy€180–340
Scenario C Disruption persists into 2027

Two heating seasons under crisis pricing

ECB severe: oil $145/bbl, gas €106/MWh peak Q2 2026; HICP 4.4% in 2026, 4.8% in 2027.

Storage refill cycle fails. Petrochemical feedstock substitution forces multi-year supply chain reconfiguration. The 2022 energy crisis becomes the comparison point on European household budgets, not Russian gas.

  • Germany€1,200–2,200
  • United Kingdom£1,100–2,000
  • Netherlands€1,050–1,950
  • PolandPLN 4,500–8,500
  • Austria€900–1,700
  • SwitzerlandCHF 1,000–1,800
  • France€750–1,400
  • Spain€550–1,000
  • Italy€500–900

Estimated annual additional household costs across the 25-item basket, by scenario. Ranges derived by applying ECB Staff Macroeconomic Projections (March 2026, Box 2 and Section 3) inflation differentials to country household final consumption expenditure (Eurostat, 2024) and weighting by each country's structural exposure score in this index. Households on fixed incomes, single-parent households and tenants in poorly insulated stock face exposures at the upper end of each range. Higher-end estimates assume both 2026 and 2027 sit in the relevant scenario's full-year impact zone.

Who pays first, and through what

Cost arrival is uneven by household type and geography. The pass-through hits in waves, not at once.

November 2026

UK and Dutch households see first heating bills under re-priced LNG contracts. UK gas reserves remain critically low entering winter, which is why UK inflation is forecast to breach 5%.

December 2026

Q4 retail repricing lands across apparel, electronics and household goods. German and Austrian households absorb largest synthetic-textile pass-through.

February 2027

European bread and cooking-oil prices reflect the spring 2026 fertiliser disruption working through the harvest cycle. Polish households most exposed via national food basket weighting.

Throughout 2027

Re-priced long-term LNG contracts carry the risk premium forward. Households on standard variable tariffs absorb it directly, with no fixed-rate cushion.

Two findings worth a second look

Wealth is no shield

Switzerland sits in the high-exposure band. Its industrial polymer demand and gas-heating share place it above eight EU economies. The Hormuz cost arrives at the Swiss household regardless of franc strength.

Italy's textile heritage shields its basket

Italy's per-capita synthetic textile consumption is the lowest of the ten countries scored. Wool, linen, cotton and leather dominate the local basket. The Hormuz disruption hits Italy's wardrobe least – the IMF flagged Italy as one of Europe's most exposed via gas-fired power, but its consumer goods basket compensates.

Ten countries, six dimensions, one composite score

The composite score combines LNG & gas dependence (25%), the e-commerce multiplier (20%), petrochemical feedstock dependence (20%), synthetic textile consumption (15%), energy-storage buffer (10%), and supply-chain concentration (10%). Scores run 0–100; higher values indicate greater structural exposure under sustained disruption.

Country Score LNG E-commerce Returns Gas heating Energy buffer Distinguishing factor
Germany#1
85
HighVery highVery highHighModerate Highest manufacturing pass-through
United Kingdom#2
81
Very highVery highHighHighCritically low Most Qatar-dependent winter
Netherlands#3
79
Very high (gas hub)HighHighHighEnergy hub exposed Gas hub feels every shock first
Poland#4
71
MediumMedium-highMediumMediumCoal reserve Bread basket most exposed
Austria#5
67
HighHighMediumHighLow reserves Highest gas-heating share
Switzerland#6
64
Medium-highHighMediumMediumHydro buffer Wealth is no shield
France#7
61
LowHighMediumLowStrong (nuclear) Nuclear shield: lowest LNG exposure in top ten
Turkey#8
56
Medium-highMediumLow-mediumMediumPipeline access Pipelines mask petrochemical exposure
Spain#9
48
Low-mediumMediumLow-mediumLowDiversified Diversification pays
Italy#10
44
MediumMediumLow-mediumLow-mediumModerate Textile heritage shields the basket

What lies beyond the news cycle

Day-to-day developments in the Strait dominate headlines but matter little for what households actually pay. The forces shaping European consumer prices over the coming years operate on slower clocks. Three horizons sit beyond the immediate news cycle, each offering a distinct frame for interpreting where the costs measured by this index are likely to settle.

Short term
3–9 months
ahead

The pass-through window

Wholesale energy and feedstock cost increases that have already been incurred work their way into shelf prices. Logistics surcharges, contract renewals, and seasonal pricing cycles transmit upstream pressure into household bills. Consumer inflation typically lags producer inflation by three to nine months in European retail.

  • Retail price pass-throughWholesale-to-shelf lag works through the system
  • Winter heating cycleStorage drawdown begins; gas-bill exposure peaks
  • Insurance & freight contractsAnnual renewals re-price war-risk premia
  • Q4 retail repricingApparel and electronics cycles set new floors
Medium term
1–2 years
ahead

The adjustment window

Procurement teams renegotiate sourcing. Storage operators rebuild buffers across one or two refill cycles. Petrochemical buyers test alternative feedstock origins. National policy responses - subsidies, strategic reserves, infrastructure decisions - begin to take effect. The country scores in this index could shift meaningfully as energy postures and supply mixes adjust.

  • LNG sourcing renegotiationMulti-year supplier contracts open for bidding
  • Storage refill cyclesTwo summer-winter rotations rebuild buffers
  • Feedstock substitutionPetrochem buyers diversify away from single sources
  • Policy interventionSubsidies, price caps, strategic reserve releases
  • E-commerce adaptationLast-mile fuel surcharges restructured
Long term
5+ years
ahead

The structural window

The dimensions that drive most of the index - petrochemical industry size, e-commerce intensity, synthetic textile consumption, energy mix - only shift on multi-year horizons. Industrial relocation, electrification of heating, biomaterial substitution, and energy-mix decarbonisation all move on this clock. The country rankings produced by this index would only fundamentally redraw themselves over a horizon of this length.

  • Energy mix transformationNuclear, renewables, hydrogen reshape D5
  • Petrochemical industry shiftCapacity relocation reshapes D3
  • Material substitutionBio-based and recycled inputs reshape D4
  • Heating electrificationHeat-pump rollout reshapes gas dependency
  • New trade routesPipeline projects, alternative shipping lanes
  • Geopolitical realignmentLong-run supplier-country relationships

The basket: 25 items, scored for structural exposure

Most basket goods are made globally - predominantly in China, South and South-East Asia, using petrochemical feedstocks from the Gulf. The ratings below do not reflect manufacturing location. They reflect each country's structural exposure to consumer price impact, driven by energy costs, LNG import dependence, the fuel surcharge embedded in last-mile logistics, and the share of the retail price tied to synthetically-affected materials.

Critical - large structural exposure High Medium Low
Product DEUKNLPLATCHFRTRESIT
Apparel & Textiles - assembled in Asia from Gulf petrochemical feedstock; price impact via logistics energy
Polyester jacketSynthetic shell, Asian assembly
Trainers / sports shoes
Running leggings / activewear
Winter duvet (synthetic fill)
Electronics - assembled in China/Taiwan; consumer impact via airfreight surcharges and domestic energy
Laptop / notebook
Smartphone
Household & Packaging - plastic products use ethylene/propylene from Gulf refineries
Plastic food containers
Bin liners / refuse bags
Flat-pack furniture (MDF/resin)
Food & Agriculture - driven by fertiliser costs (Arabian Gulf ≈ 46% of global urea flows, Signal Ocean) and transport energy
Bread (fertiliser & freight)
Cooking oil (palm / sunflower)
Fertiliser (urea, retail bag)
Energy & Transport - directly driven by crude and LNG prices
Petrol / unleaded fuel (per L)
Gas bill / heating
Flight ticket (jet fuel surcharge)
Personal care & Household - petrochemical surfactants and polymers, globally manufactured
Disposable nappies / diapers
Detergent (synthetic surfactants)
Liquid soap / shower gel
Automotive - synthetic rubber tyres (butadiene from naphtha); motor oil direct from crude
Car tyres (synthetic rubber)
Motor oil / lubricant
EV battery (petcoke / processing)
Synthetic sofa cushion (polyurethane)

Ratings reflect structural exposure in the destination market - not the country of manufacture, and not a price forecast.

How the index was built

The European Hormuz Basket Index assigns each country a composite exposure score from 0 to 100. The score is built from six independently measured dimensions, each scored 0–100 and multiplied by its weight. The index measures structural exposure, not real-time spot prices. All input data come from named public sources covering 2024–2026.

How a country gets its score

The same four steps are applied identically to every country.

01Dimensions

Pick six dimensions that drive consumer-price exposure

Each country is measured on the same six dimensions: LNG and gas dependence, e-commerce intensity, petrochemical feedstock dependence, synthetic textile consumption, energy storage buffer, and supply-chain concentration. These were chosen because together they capture the main pathways through which a Strait of Hormuz disruption reaches a household's shelf - energy bills, retail logistics, manufactured goods, and food.

02Score

Score each country 0–100 on every dimension

For each dimension, every country receives a raw score from 0 (no exposure) to 100 (maximum exposure). Scores are calculated from the underlying public data - for example, LNG share of national gas supply, e-commerce penetration rates, petrochemical-industry size, gas-storage levels - and normalised across the ten countries so the highest-exposure country sits near the top of the scale.

Example - D1 LNG dependence The UK scores 90 (highest) because it has the largest Qatari LNG share and critically low gas reserves. France scores 28 (lowest) because its electricity supply runs largely on nuclear and its gas dependence is structurally low.
03Weight

Apply weights so bigger drivers count more

Not every dimension matters equally. Energy and industrial structure drive the largest share of consumer-price exposure, so they carry the heaviest weights. The weights - D1 25%, D2 20%, D3 20%, D4 15%, D5 10%, D6 10% - total 100% and are applied identically to every country.

Why weights matter A country can score badly on a small-weight dimension without it shifting the total much. France, for example, scores moderately on petrochemical dependence (D3, 20% weight) but has a near-zero score on energy buffer (D5, 10% weight, inverted) - and its overall score is pulled down by the strength of that buffer.
04Combine

Multiply, sum, round to a single 0–100 score

Each country's six dimension scores are multiplied by their weights and summed. The result is the country's final composite score, rounded to a whole number. 80–90 is Critical, 65–79 is High, 50–64 is Medium, under 50 is Low.

Worked example - Germany (78 × 0.25) + (95 × 0.20) + (88 × 0.20) + (85 × 0.15) + (62 × 0.10) + (82 × 0.10) = 83.25 → rounded to 85

Note on dimension D5 (Energy storage buffer). This dimension is inverted: a strong buffer reduces exposure, so a high buffer translates to a low D5 score. France scores low on D5 (well-buffered), which lowers its total. The UK scores high on D5 (poorly buffered), which raises its total.

Total = (D1 × 0.25) + (D2 × 0.20) + (D3 × 0.20) + (D4 × 0.15) + (D5 × 0.10) + (D6 × 0.10)
Worked example - Germany: (78×0.25) + (95×0.20) + (88×0.20) + (85×0.15) + (62×0.10) + (82×0.10) = 83.25, rounded to 85.
DimensionWeight DEUKNLPLATCHFRTRESIT
D1 - LNG & gas dependence25%78908852746028583855
D2 - E-commerce multiplier20%95888265707668485542
D3 - Petrochemical feedstock20%88728574657270585044
D4 - Synthetic textile consumption15%85727068626558604832
D5 - Energy buffer (inverted)10%62857840723818553048
D6 - Supply-chain concentration10%82687280556058504538
Total100%85817971676461564844
25%D1: LNG & Gas

LNG & Gas Dependence

Scored on three inputs: (a) share of national gas supply from LNG in 2025, (b) Qatar-specific LNG dependence as a share of total LNG imports, and (c) gas storage level relative to EU mandated targets. Qatar supplies approximately 9% of total EU LNG imports.

Sources - Gas Infrastructure Europe (AGSI); Reuters LNG flow reporting (March 2026); European Commission gas storage data; Bruegel European natural gas imports dataset; Wood Mackenzie LNG transit analysis (March 2026).

20%D2: E-commerce

E-commerce Multiplier

Calculated as: (e-commerce penetration × 0.6) + (fashion return rate × 0.4), normalised 0–100. Germany scores highest, with the highest combined penetration and return rates among the ten countries scored.

Sources - Eurostat e-commerce penetration data (isoc_ec_ibuy); national e-commerce retail surveys; published industry return-rate studies. Specific national figures: verify with Afterbuy Research before citation.

20%D3: Petrochemicals

Petrochemical Feedstock Dependence

Measures industrial exposure to Gulf-sourced petrochemical feedstocks: ethylene, propylene, methanol and sulphur. Germany scores highest, reflecting its position as Europe's largest chemicals producer.

Sources - CEFIC European Chemical Industry Facts & Figures; Eurostat structural business statistics; Gulf Petrochemicals and Chemicals Association (GPCA) production data. Specific national figures: verify with Afterbuy Research before citation.

15%D4: Textiles

Synthetic Textile Consumption

Per-capita consumption of synthetic textiles: polyester, nylon, acrylic and elastane. Germany leads the ten countries scored on this dimension.

Sources - Textile Exchange Materials Market Report; EURATEX industry statistics. Specific national figures: verify with Afterbuy Research before citation.

10%D5: Energy Buffer

Energy Storage Buffer (inverted)

An inverted score: higher buffer = lower exposure score on this dimension. France scores lowest (best protected), reflecting its dominant nuclear power share - approximately 70% of national electricity generation.

Sources - Ember Global Electricity Review (France country profile); EDF nuclear output statistics; Gas Infrastructure Europe storage data; World Nuclear Association.

10%D6: Supply Chain

Supply-Chain Concentration

Measures the degree to which key basket items rely on Gulf-sourced supply chains. The Arabian Gulf accounts for approximately 46% of global seaborne urea fertiliser flows (Signal Ocean, 2025), making fertiliser-dependent basket items a key driver of this dimension.

Sources - Signal Ocean / TSG Market Insights (March 2026); IFPRI fertilizer market analysis (April 2026); American Farm Bureau Federation Market Intel (March 2026); International Fertilizer Association (IFA).

Limitations and caveats. Dimension scores draw on normalised quantitative inputs where data are available, and on informed estimates where no country-specific public data exist. The composite is a structural index and is not a price forecast. The "Snapshot" section reports volatile, point-in-time figures that do not feed the index calculation.

All data used in this index is drawn from public, named sources

Every dimension score in the Hormuz Basket Index is built from public, traceable data - institutional statistics, industry body reports, specialised market intelligence and peer-reviewed journalism. The full source list is reproduced below for verification and citation.

Eurostat - Comext energy trade data, 2025 full year.
ec.europa.eu/eurostat
Eurostat - isoc_ec_ibuy, individuals using internet for ordering goods/services, 2025.
ec.europa.eu/eurostat
Eurostat - nrg_ind_pehcf, electricity production by fuel type, 2024.
ec.europa.eu/eurostat
European Commission - Gas Market Report Q2 2025.
energy.ec.europa.eu
Gas Infrastructure Europe - Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory, March 2026.
agsi.gie.eu
IEEFA - European LNG Tracker, October 2025.
ieefa.org
Kpler - LNG terminal flow data and Strait of Hormuz shipping analytics, 2026.
kpler.com
IEA - World Energy Outlook 2025; Coal 2025 report.
iea.org
Ember - Global Electricity Review, France country profile, 2025.
ember-energy.org
EDF - Nuclear output statistics, 2025.
edf.fr
World Nuclear Association - France country profile, 2026.
world-nuclear.org
CEFIC - European Chemical Industry Facts & Figures 2024.
cefic.org
Textile Exchange - Preferred Fiber & Materials Market Report 2024.
textileexchange.org
EURATEX - European Apparel and Textile Confederation, industry statistics 2024.
euratex.eu
Statista - E-Commerce returns in Europe, March 2025; country penetration data 2025.
statista.com
IPC - Cross-Border E-Commerce Shopper Survey 2025.
ipc.be
Landmark Global - German E-Commerce Essential Facts 2025.
landmarkglobal.com
IFA - International Fertilizer Association, world fertiliser trade statistics 2025.
ifa.asso.fr
WEF - Beyond Oil: 9 Commodities Impacted by the Hormuz Crisis, April 2026.
weforum.org
Lloyd's List Intelligence - Vessel tracking, Gulf stranded tonnage, April 2026.
lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com
S&P Global Platts - European petrochemical market assessments 2024/2025.
spglobal.com/commodityinsights
Euronews - Which EU countries are most exposed to the LNG disruption? March 2026.
euronews.com
Atlantic Council - How the Iran War Could Trigger a European Energy Crisis, March 2026.
atlanticcouncil.org
ECCO Climate - Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz: gas prices and European strategic autonomy, March 2026.
eccoclimate.org
European Central Bank - ECB staff macroeconomic projections, March 2026 (baseline, adverse and severe Hormuz scenarios).
ecb.europa.eu
Bruegel - 2026 European energy crisis fiscal response tracker, April 2026.
bruegel.org
Kiel Institute - Policy Brief No. 206, "The Cost of Closing the Strait of Hormuz", March 2026.
kielinstitut.de
IMF - "How the War in the Middle East Is Affecting Energy, Trade, and Finance", March 2026.
imf.org
Eurostat - Household final consumption expenditure by purpose (COICOP), 2024.
ec.europa.eu/eurostat
UNCTAD - Strait of Hormuz disruptions: Implications for global trade and development, 2026.
unctad.org

Limitations and reservations. Dimension values are based on normalised quantitative inputs where data are available, and on informed estimates where no country-specific public data exist. The overall value is a structural index and does not represent a price forecast. Afterbuy Research is a data journalism function of Afterbuy GmbH. Contact: press@press.primespotpr.com

Available for citation, reuse, and reproduction

All scores, dimensions, source data and methodology behind this index are available for editorial use. The underlying data table and per-dimension scores can be supplied as CSV. Visualisations (the country grid, the basket matrix, the methodology table) can be supplied as high-resolution images. For interview requests, additional country breakdowns, source verification or any clarification on the underlying data, please use the press contact opposite.

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